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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

TESTAMENTARY CHARACTER AND INTENT
In Lewis' Estate' the Blackstonian definition was reiterated that a will is
the legal declaration of a man's intentions which he wills to be performed after
his death, "man" being used of course in a generic sense. The same definition
is emphasized by the same court in Reynolds v. Maust. 2 However, in Lewis'
Estate, supra, it is likewise said that the law does not require a will to be in
any particular form as long as the language used shows an obvious intention or
purpose on the part of the testator to dispose of his property after his death.
No wills act has specified the form a will must assume and there have been no
specifications laid down as to materials to be used in the preparation of a will.
The Wills Act of 1917 provides that every will shall be in writing except a
nuncupation, but there is no provision as to the material with which or upon which
a will shall be written. As signing was, according to the interpretation of the
courts, left to the customs of the people and to the times in which the law was
operating, so in the case of materials to be used. Ancient wills were written upon
parchment and in very early times sheets of wax were used and in still earlier
times tablets of clay.3 Today paper is the ordinary material and the characters
may be written in ink or in pencil or by typewriting, in long or short hand, and in
any language. In Lipman's Estate 4 the will was in Yiddish. As late as 1877,
it was questioned in Pennsylvania whether a will written in lead pencil was good,
and in Myers v. Vanderbilt 5 the matter was settled by our Supreme Court holding
that a will written and signed with lead pencil was "in writing" within the Wills
Act of 1833 and therefore valid. The objections made to a will in lead pencil
have been that it probably was only deliberative, rather than final, further that
it might easily be erased and that it was impermanent. Consequently a thoughtful writer has suggested that the prudent testator should write out his entire will
in ink with his own hand that there be no question of the genuineness of th'e whole
or of provisions inserted without his knowledge or understanding.' However,
the law does not forbid any materials to be used and the sole problem is as to
testamentary intent. It was mooted in Woodward's Will 7 as to the validity of a
will written upon a slate with a slate pencil but the question did not come directly
before the court and hence the problem was not actually determined. However,
the general inference was that any material whatsoever may be used, provided
1139 Pa. Super. Ct. 83 (1940), 11 A. 2d. 83.
2142 Pa. Super. Ct. 109 (1940), 15 A. 2d. 853, affirming 87 P.L. J. 339 (1938).
aWill of Uah, about 1805 B. C. Wigmore, Panorama of the World's Legal Systems, page 22,
library Edition, WASHINGTON LAW BOOK Co., Washington, D. C.
4336 Pa. 570 (1940), 10 A. 2d. 385.
684 Pa. 510 (1877), 24 Am. Rep. 227; Tomlinson's Estate, 133 Pa. 245 (1890), 19 A. 482,
19 Am. St. 637. Cf. Patterson v. English, 71 Pa. 454 (1872).
6Rood ON WILLS, 2nd Ed. sec. 246. A wise precaution in these days of typewriting and
facility
7 of insertion.
1 W. N. C. 177 (1875).
Proof too meager and too doubtful.
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testamentary intent appears. With perishable materials it is arguable that the
writing was deliberative, rather than final and hence lacking in testamentary intent.
In the case of wills written upon a slate, or shingle or blackboard, it might be urged
with force that the matter was not seriously considered but perpetrated as a joke
or presented as an experiment. If other facts would show the seriousness of intent,
there is no reason in the law why such wills would not be probative.8
FORM

The law of wills as laid down in the statutes and applied by the courts has
favored the exercise of testamentary power, hence as stated, no special forms of
language are required. In Kimmel's Estate9 Simpson, J., pointed out that the
informal character of a paper is immaterial, provided it appears thereby that the
decedent intended to make a posthumous gift and also pointing out that the
cases showed a great variety of papers had been held actually testamentary although
in the form of deeds, mortgages, letters, powers of attorney, agreements, checks
and notes. But these instances are what might be aptly phrased "horrible examples," in short for admonition and not to be followed, displaying, nevertheless,
the great leniency of the courts. The courts have also exhibited great liberality
in construing wills as codicils, in order to reach a desired end. In Bingaman's
Estate10 a will was construed to be a codicil in order to save the charitable bequests
in the former will. Likewise, in Hengen's Estate11 an informal writing was deemed
to be a codicil to a formally executed will.12
INTENT

However irregular the document may be in form, the essential requisite is
the testamentary intent impelling the writing. The ascertainment of testamentary
intent is a matter of interpretation of language as used and a question of law to be
determined by the court. In Knoll v. Hart, 18 Kephart, J. explained:
"In judicial construction, one of the principal tests as to whether
a document is a will or a conveyance inter vivos is: Was an estate
granted, and when did the maker intend that the instrument creating
it should be effective? If the maker intended the paper to be effective at death, it is a will. Thus in Turner v. Scott, supra, the leading
case on the subject, the writing, in form a deed, stated: 'This conveyance in no way to take effect until after the decease of the said John
Scott the grantor.' Though the instrument spoke in terms of a con8Cf. Reed v. Woodward, 11 Phila. 541 (1877), per Butler, J.
9278 Pa. 435 (1924), 123 A. 405.
10281 Pa. 497 (1924), 127 A. 73.
Pa. 547 (1940), 12 A. 2d. 119.
11337
2
1 For some good suggestions on how to draft a will, see ROOD ON WILLS, 2nd ed. sec. 318a

and following.
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veyance, we held that the declared purpose of the maker was that
the paper was not to be effective until his death, thus causing it to
be testamentary. See, also, Fellbush v. Fellbush, 216 Pa. 141, 65 A.
28; Losch's Estate, 264 Pa. 58, 107 A. 375, and many other cases of
like import."
The matter of construction may be a very easy one or it may present a problem soluble only after very careful consideration and study. Keeping in mind the
definition that the will is a disposition to take effect at death, the question is what
does the language mean as used by the writer. A few cases will illustrate the extremes in "home-made" wills where most of the litigation is found. In Sullivan's
Estate13 is a model of brevity, clarity and terseness with no great waste of words,
howbeit, spelling a trifle faulty:
"March th'e 4 Will my properti to my wief my death
John Sullivan."
The writing is obviously testamentary. The words "my death" could have
been omitted. The significant word left is "Will," a technical expression having
a well recognized legal as well as lay meaning. It was held this paper was properly admitted to probate.
On the other extreme is Hengen's Estate14 where a paper was offered for
probate as a codicil to a formal will, the latter dated July 20, 1935, testatrix dying
January 24, 1938, the words were:
'Iwant Mamie to have my House 544 George St.
M. L. Hengen."
This paper was found in a drawer, together with the decedent's will and her
other important papers, pinned to the active page of a savings account book evidencing one of the principal assets of the estate. It was in the decedent's handwriting and
was signed by her, but not dated. The house described was the only real estate
owned by decedent at her death.
Are the words testamentary?

Said Patterson, J.:

"Here, as in the Tozer case, the paper could accomplish its intended purpose of conveying the real estate only as a testamentary
disposition, and here, as there, the paper was in the possession of the
decedent to the moment of death and was placed by her where it
would certainly be discovered after death .........
.Under all
the circumstances, the words 'I want Mamie to have my House' necessarily must be taken to refer to a time in the future, to wit, after the
death of the testatrix, and therefore the court below rightly held the
instrument to be testamentary in character."
13130 Pa. 342 (1889), 18 A. 1120.
14337 Pa. 547 (1940), 12 A. 2d. 119.
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In Tozer v. Jackson 15 referred to, supra, by the learned justice, the informal
writing offered for probate read:
"High James Rogers do give to John Jackson, Sr., my property
known as 'Pen Argyl Hotel' and the land adjoining, in Pen Argyle, in
Northampton County, P. A. Jamts Rogers."
The writer committed suicide and this paper was found on top of a trunk
in the bed room where the body was lying.
It will be noticed that these last two cases differ from the Sullivan case, supra,
in that the latter writing showed on its face that the disposition was to take place
at death, whereas in the other two cases the time of disposition must be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances. It is possible, however, to reach the same
goal of construction in Hengen's Estate, supra, by what may be termed inductive
or progressive steps in the art of interpretation. In Sullivan's Estate, supra, the
16
word was "Will" which is obvious and speaks for itself. In Gaston's Estate the
of
equivalent
words were, "It my wish" and the word "wish" was interpreted as the
"will." Proceeding one step further in Hengen's Estate, supra, the words "I want"
17
may be interpreted as equivalent to "I wish." In Knox's Estate the paper sustained as a will was in form of a letter but not addressed to any particular person.
It was written in lead pencil and sign'ed "Harriet" and disposed of personal property to various persons a.id directed certain things to be done. It began with the
words, "A few little things I would love to have done." Further on the writer
directed: "Please have just my baptismal names on stones." These two expressions
were the only ones indicative of testamentary intent. It was held, per Mitchell, J.,
that the writing was "clearly testamentary" as it had the essential element of being
a disposition of property to take effect after death.
In Frew v. Clarke's the paper admitted to probate was in the form of an
order directing the subscriber's "administrators or executors, in case of my death
to pay Robert D. Clarke the sum of $75,000., as a token of my regard for him."
19
Similarly, some years later in Wolfe's Estate a bank check filled out and
directed to "My Executor" for $4700. payable to the order of Merle H. Baker "for
his labor" was held testamentary in character.
20
An unusual set of facts is found in Fosstlman v. Elder where the testatrix
Fosselman. She
Isabelle
niece,
in 1878 executed a will giving certain legacies to a
died later and among her papers was found a sealed tnvelope endorsed in her own
hand as follows:

16154 Pa. 223 (1893),
16188 Pa. 374 (1898),
17131 Pa. 220 (1890),
1880 Pa. 170 (1875).
19284 Pa. 169 (1925),
2098 Pa. 159 (1881).

26 A. 226. Cf. Tozer v. Jackson, 164 Pa. 373.
41 A. 529. (1894), 30 A. 400.
18 A. 1021.
130 A. 501.
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"Dear Bella, this is for you to open."
The envelope contained a note for $2000. and the following in the hand of the
testatrix:
"Lewistown, October 2nd, 1879. My wish is for you to draw this
$2000.00 for your use should I die sudden.
Elizabeth Fosselman."
The testatrix did die suddenly. It was held that the endorsement on the envelope
and the contents thereof together constituted a valid testamentary disposition of the
note to the person named in the endorsement on the envelope, the combination
21
operating as a codicil to the testatrix's will.
In Harrison's Estate22 testatrix left a will which was duly probated. Later
there was found an envelope containing five bonds and four stock certificates. On
the envelope appeared this endorsement:
"June 21, 1897. Six bonds for my brother John's three daughters,
also one for my nephew John Beard, to be sold after my death. P. H.
P. Harrison."
Similar legacies were given in the will to the same legatees. It was held that the
endorsement on the envelope was a valid codicil to the will and the securities were
properly awarded to the persons named in addition to the legacies given them
under the terms of the will.
In Glass' Estate 23 the will of testatrix was probated and later an envelope was
found bearing on its face a writing alleged to be testamentary and containing
securities of the value of $3350.00. The envelope was unsealed and on its face
appeared the following:
"Property of Charles C. Gearhartc/o John Wanamaker,
Philadelphia.
"To My ExecutorPlease deliver enclosed to Mr. Gearhart at the above address.
Sara C. Glass
"Held for safe keeping."
Gearhart filed an appeal from the probate of the will and later presented his petition to the orphans' court for a citation to show cause why the decree of probate
should not be opened and leave granted to produce and offer for probate as a codicil
21Cf. Maxwell's Estate, 18 D & C 111 (1933); Koenig's Estate, 22 D & C 275 (1935); Note
117 A. L. R. 132gn. for Fosselman v. Elder.
22196 Pa. 576 (1900), 46 A. 888. For the rule that the legacies are cumulative and not sub.
stitutional see, Sponsler's Appeal, 107 Pa. 95 (1884); Manifold's Appeal, 126 Pa. 508 (1889),
19 A. 42; Powell's Estate, 138 Pa. 322 (1890), 22 A. 92.
28331 Pa. 561 (1938), 1 A. 2d. 239.
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27

to the decedent's will the envelope and contents. The court after hearing dismissed
the appeal on the theory that the envelope was not testamentary but merely directory to the executor to deliver to Gearhart his property. The decree entered was
reversed on appeal, Maxey, J.,holding that the paper was testamentary and that
the facts showed clearly the property in the envelope belonged to the decedent,
but she was giving the same to the appellant by this codicil which should be probated.
In Turner v. Scott,24 a father executed "an indenture" to his son with general
warranty for a tract of land in fee, in consideration of love and affection, performing certain services and maintaining grantor's wife if she survived him, reserving
the land to the grantor for his life, the "conveyance in no way to take effect until
after his decease." In an action of ejectment brought after the death of the father
by certain of his devisees against the grantee in the above "indenture" it was held
that the instrument in question was testamentary in character and therefore revocable and as the father had specifically revoked this instrument by a later will devising
the property in question to the plaintiffs they were entitled to recover in this action.
Said Woodward, J.:
"The doctrine of the case is, that whatever the form of the instrument, if it vest no present interest but only appoints what is to be done
after the death of the maker, it is a testamentary instrument. It signifies nothing that the parties meant to make a deed instead of a will.
If they have used language which the law holds to be testamentary,
their intention is to be gathered from the legal import of the words
they have employed, for all parties must be judged by the legal meaning
of their words.'
The aftermath of Turner v. Scott, supra, is found in Scott vs. Scott,"5 where
it was held that the writing in form of a deed, but in fact a will, which contained
a covenant of warranty of land designed to be passed, was not a covenant of warranty in view of the fact that the instrument was a will and not a deed. Furthermore,
as the instrument granted real estate to the grantee after the death of the grantor and
in the meantime the grantor devised the land in question to others, there could not
be a breach of the covenant so as to subject the grantor or his executors after his
deatlb to an action. It was also observed to sustain an action on a covenant of
warranty there must be an actual or constructive eviction by title paramount.
The same result of Turner v. Scott, supra, was attained in Coulter v. Shermadine26 where the facts were very similar, a husband conveying all his right, title and
interest in certain land to his wife "her heirs and assigns, for her sole benefit and
use during her natural life. After her death the same to be divided among my
2451 Pa. 126 (1866); cf. Book v. Book, 104 Pa. 240 (1883), distinguishing Turner v. Scott,
supra; also contra, Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39 (1904), and 7 Ann. Cas. 790, n.
2570 Pa. 244 (1871) ; cf. with advice of Woodward, J.,in Turner v. Scott, supra. Long's Appeal, 86 Pa. 196 (1878).
26204 Pa. 120 (1902), 53 A. 638.
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legal heirs. Provided this assignment shall not be of any effect until after my
death." This paper was held to be testamentary in character and the wife did not
take a fee simple in the lands.
Likewise Turner v. Scott, supra, was followed in Losch's Estate2 7 where
specific performance was sought based on a paper signed by the decedent November 12, 1913, and five days before his death which reads as follows:
"I will give my home Furnished as it now is all of 619. Linden
st. to my present housekeeper who is now taking care of me to Angelina Kern. For special favors and honest kind work and good service
she has done for me during the last three month and before. she
shall have my home which I promised to her. Also for the last three
years past for staying with me. to the end of my life. I name and
order my executor James Kressler, lawful to sign said Deed over to
in her name. and after my death to hand and deliver said deed to
her. Angeline Kern. Witness my hand and seal. (Signed) Charles
Losch (Seal) In the presence of Angie Kern."
The court dismissed the bill holding that the paper in question was testamentary and not a contract to be specifically enforced. On appeal the decree was
affirmed, it being pointed out that the paper vested no present interest but only
appointed what was to be done after the death of the maker and that this was the
test of its character.
A situation quite similar had been litigated some years before in Wilson v.
VanLeer 28 where the decedent executed and delivered to the plaintiff the following
paper:
"August 13, 1865. 1 give thes fiew lines to Caroline Carman
to show that I want her to have the sum of Twelve hundred dolars at
my death she livd with mee A number of years and get verry little
for it so i thought It rite to leave her This little sum to be paid to her
out of my home property.
from Needham Wilson."
After Wilson's death Caroline brought assumpsit against his executors, the
claim being founded on the above paper and also on a count in quantum meruit.
It was held that the above paper was testamentary in character and hence did not
support an action in assumpsit. Further, the paper not having been admitted to
probate was inadmissible in evidence under the general claim for services.
Another case of a similar nature is Megary's Estate 29 wherein the facts were
that Sarah Megary signed a paper directed to "to whom it may concern" and stating
that as a certain person mentioned therein had lived with her and had done various
27264 Pa.
28103 Pa.
quent litigation
29206 Pa.

58 (1919), 107 A. 375, cited by Maxey, J.,in Glass' Estate, supra, note 23.
600 (1883); cf.Wilson v. VanLeer, 127 Pa. 371 (1889), 17 A. 1097 for subseon will.
260 (1903), 55 A. 963.
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kinds of work and had made no charges for the same, it was the desir'e of the said
Sarah that this person should receive a certain sum of money out of the said Sarah's
Estate. There was also an expression that this was not to affect any provision that
she, the said Sarah might make for this same person in "any will or testament"
that the said Sarah might make. It was held, reversing the decree of the Register
and the Court below that this paper was testamentary in character and should have
been admitted to probate as the will of the said Sarah.
In Rose v. Quick, 30 a paper was in the form of a power of attorney authorizing
two persons therein named to administer on the subscribed estate and to make
certain disposition of the property of the subscriber. This was held to be a
good will and the persons therein named although not specifically described as
executors, nevertheless, were such and by the terms of the paper empowered to
sell the real estate of the testator.
In Davis's Estate,3 1 the paper was in the form of a letter using the expressions
"Shoul I dye in the near futur" certain things were to be done. The quoted language was held to render the letter testamentary in character. Said Sadler, J.:
"No facts were in dispute, and had a jury trial been had, the
court necessarily would have instructed as to the legal effect of the
words in question. It is not for a jury to sp'eculate upon a possible
intention of a testator, but for the Court to interpret the language
which appears: Brown v. Brown, 6 Watts 54; Curty v. Monnin, 14
Pa. Super. Ct. 102. Like determinations are found where, upon undisputed facts, the question of th'e reasonableness of delay in the performance of some obligation is involved, it being the duty of the
Court to solve the difficulty as a matter of law: Leaming v. Wise,
73 Pa. 173; Wright v. General Carbonic Co., 271 Pa. 332."
32
Says Simpson, J. in Kimmel's Estate:

"It is equally clear that where, as here, the words 'if enny thing
hapens' condition the gift, they strongly support the idea of a testamentary intent; indeed they exactly state what is expressed in or must
be implied from every will. True, if the particular contingency stated
in a paper, as the condition upon which it shall become effective, has
never in fact occurred, it will not be admitted to probate: Morrow's
App., 116 Pa. 440; Forquer's Est., 216 Pa. 331. In the present case,
however, it is clear the contingency, 'if enny thing hapens,' was still
existing when testator died suddenly on the same day he wrote and
mailed the letter; hence, the facts not being disputed, the question of
testamentary intent was one of law for the Court: Davis's Est., 275
Pa. 126." 33
3030 Pa. 225 (1858).
31275 Pa. 126 (1922), 118 A. 645.
32278 Pa. 435 (1924), 123 A. 405.
33
Pritchett's Estate, 9 Pa. C. C. 600 (1891); Lambaert's Est., 10 Pa. C. C. 10 (1893);
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In Tranor's Estate" a curious home-made production appeared in the following words:
"May 1st, 1929.

"Last will and Testament of William J. Tranor I
bequeath:
"All my Personal and real estate to My three Sons
and Caroline C. Pierce Collected Equally.
"C. 0. D.-I C. L.
"The residary of my estate including the insurance
goes to Arthur W. Pierce.
April, 1929
Pierce My
C.
apoint--Caroline
"To all, I hereby
Eyeuter in the Above estate
"Win. J. Tranor
"My hand and seal
"Caroline C. Pierce
"Witnes:
"Henry A. Haas
"James Pilkington"
Tranor died in August of 1931 leaving three sons surviving. Letters of administration were granted to one of them who filed his account in March of 1932.
Decedent's housekeeper, Caroline Pierce, filed exceptions to the account setting
forth, inter alia, that Tranor died testate and that his will was in the possession
of the aministrator. These exceptions led to the production of the paper as above
outlined but probate was stopped by caveat lodged by decedents' sons. The register certified the proceeding to the Orphans' Court and after hearing the learned
judge concluded as follows:
"And after an impartial weighing of all the evidence in the case
and the arguments of counsel, 1 feel so uncertain on the points:
whether or not the signature to this paper is that of William J. Tranor
and whether or not the said paper is his will that I could conscionably
sustain a finding either way on the controlling issues here involved.
Therefore, I award an issue devisavit vel non directed to the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County to determine two questions:
1. Is the signature to the paper that of William J. Tranor or is it a
forgery; 2. Is the paper the will of William J. Tranor."
The issue was tried and the jury answered the first question by saying "that
the signature to the paper is that of William J. Tranor," and the second "that the
paper is not, the will of William J. Tranor." On appeal the Supreme Court reKnight's Estate, 8 D. & C. 621 (1927).
84325 Pa. 263 (1936), 188 A. 292.
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versed holding per Linn, J., that the jury's answer to the second question was a
conclusion of law and not the determination of a question of fact, and hence it had
been erroneously submitted by the lower court. 55 Concerning the nature of the
paper thL learned justice declared:
"We come then to a consideration of the text of the instrument,
for, if its testamentary character is apparent on its face, it is the duty
of the court so to give it effect. McCune's Estate, 265 Pa. 523, 109 A.
156; Davis's Estate, 275 Pa. 126, 118 A. 645; Kimmel's Estate, 278
Pa. 435, 123 A. 405, 31 A. L. R. 678; Wolfe's Estate, 284 Pa. 169,
130 A. 501. It is written on a sheet of letter paper. The words from
'May 1st, 1929' to the letters 'C 0. D-I C. L.' are on the first page;
all the rest of it is on the back of that page. By what appears on the
first page, he gave all his real and personal estate in equal shares to
Caroline Pierce and to his three sons. He left personalty consisting
of cash, mortgages, and contents of a barn, appraised at a total of
$21,091.83, and, in addition, a farm. Claims against the personalty
left a balance for distribution in the neighborhood of $1,700. The
lines at the top of the second page, "The residary of my estate including the insurance goes to Arthur W. Pierce. April 1929,' were the
subject of examination when Caroline Pierce was on the witness stand
in the orphans' court, and perhaps created the difficulty in the mind of
the court below. In answer to questions put by the learned trial judge,
she stated that those words were her will and related to her own property. We are not now concerned with the effect, if any, that those
words might have in disposing of her property. But if we should
assume that she intended them as her will, that fact would not destroy
the testamentary character of the instrument (see Cawley's Estate,
136 Pa. 628, 20 A. 567, 10 L. R. A. 93; Hoffert's Estate, 65 Pa. Super.
515; Rhodes' Estate, 277 Pa. 450, 121 A. 327; Sterrett's Estate, 322

Pa. 300, 309, 185 A. 2141; it expressly recites Tranor's testamentary
intent."
The aforegoing case as a legal curiosity is matched by Gibson's Estate86
wherein there was an appeal from an order of the Orphans' Court of Butler
County admitting to probate a writing alleged to be the last will and testament of
Bracken Gibson. The sole question involved was whether the paper was testamentary in character. The following copy is printed on the margin of the report:

"July 27, 1923
"Regardless of 'will or wills, 90 days after date of
my death must collect from my estate and pay to the order
of Jennie Negley $5.00 a week from 18 to 25 years of
age for labor
35
1n accd. Phillips' Estate, 299 Pa. 415 (1930),
(1939), 9 A. 2d. 539.

86128 Pa. Super. Ct. 44 (1937),

193 A. 302.

149 A. 719; Orlady's Estate, 336 Pa. 369
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Hannahtown Butler Co. Pa.
$2500.
Hundred dollars for Property
near
Dollars which was not allowed
to be given her through Will.
Without
Defalcation, Value Received, With interest
"And further she can empower any Attorney of any
Court of Record within the United States or elsewhere to
appear for me and after one or more declarations filed,
confess judgment against my estate as of any term for the
above sum with costs of suit and Attorney's commission of
per cent for collection and release of all errors, and without stay of execution and inquisition and extension upon
any levy on real estate is hereby waived, and condemnation
agreed to and the exemption of personal property from
levy and sale on an execution hereon, is also hereby
expressly waived, andno benefit of exemption be claimed
under and by virtue of any exemption law now in force or
which may be hereafter passed.
"Witness my hand and seal
c/o

Bracken Gibson (Seal)
James G. Elliott (Seal)."

(We have italicized the written portion of the instrument).
The Register refused to probate this paper and the proceedings were then certified
to the orphans' court which awarded an issue for determination of the fact as to
whether the signature "Bracken Gibson" was his signature. The jury found that
it was in fact the decedent's signature and thereupon the court held as a matter of
law that the writing was testamentary and remitted to the register for probate.
An only son appealed from the final order of the court, assigning as error the
determination that the writing was testamentary. In affirming the decree of the
court below, Judge Parker reviewed the leading cases which have already been
considered and agreed that despite its inartistic form the paper was testamentary
in character, pointing out that a parallel situation was to be found in Turner vs.
Scott 87 where the will was in the form of a deed and contained a convenant of
warranty. The learned judge further distinguished this case from Sunday's
Estate 8 and held that testamentary intent did not have to be proved by two witnesses in the particular case. The closing paragraph of the opinion is as follows:
"There is no doubt that the mere deferring of payment until
after the death of the maker is not of itself sufficient to make a writing
testamentary (Eisenlohr's Estate (No. 2), 258 Pa. 438, 102 A. 117),
but here no present interest vested in Mrs. Negley. She had no enforceable right and wt are not dealing with a situation where there
8751 Pa. 126 (1866).
38167 Pa. 30 (1895), 31 A. 353.
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is a contract supported by a consideration. Bracken Gibson could have
revoked the gift at any time. There was no vesting of an irrevocable
right in her. This was emphasized by the fact that he struck out the
words 'I promise to pay' and inserted a diection as to what should
be done at his death."
Another odd case, the will of a very illiterate man, illustrating the leniency
of the courts and the matter of testamentary intent is that of Bogart's Estate. 3 '
The document consisted of a sheet of paper folded once, thereby making four
pages although not numbered. On the first page appeared the following:
"Bloomsburg, Pa.
June 13, 1913
"George W. Bogart is going to appoint his son Lewis exeurty to settle up his astate after he is dead and gone. He
is to divided all his financials to his children equally. If
there is any property, to sell it and divide the money equally to the said children."
At the foot of page 2, otherwise blank, was the following:
"George W. Bogart."
"Witnesses
J. C. BuchLr, Catawissa, Pa.
George W. Witenight Madens town Ship."
At tl.e top of page 3, appears the following:
"tow lewis Bogart
And Cary Mekiek
And irene girton
And Dasy runen"
Part of the above was written in ink and that italicized was written in lead
pencil, part was written by Bucher and part by the testator. The register, reading
the paper in the order of pages 1, 3 and 2, admitted the entire instrument to probate. From this decision, testator's grandchildren, who were children of testator's
daughter, who was living when the will was made but had died before testator,
appealed to the Orphans' Court claiming the share of their mother pursuant to
Section 15 of the Wills Act of 1917,40 under so much of the instrument as was
written in ink. The court sustained their appeal and excluded page 3 as an unsigned codicil and directed the probate of pages 1 and 2. On appeal the decree
41
of the lower court was affirmed.
In Schad's Appeal 42 the decedent after reciting the fact that he had insured
his life in a certain insurance company assigned the proceeds of the policy to his
3996 Pa. Super. Ct. 26 (1929).
40p. L. 403, 408, 20 PS 251.
41Linn, J., called attention that there is no authority for a joint appeal by testator's three chil.
dren but instead of quashing, it was treated as the appeal of one of the three, see McGlinn's Estate,
270 Pa. 373 (1921), 113 A. 548.
4288 Pa. 111 (1878) ; see also Beaumont's Estate, 214 Pa. 445 (1906), 63 A. 102) deed assigning bonds to a trust co. for certain purposes held testamentary, per Stewart, J,
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wife to take effect after his death, "when she can do with it according to her best
will, without partiality towards her children. This I have written with good sound
mind and set my name to it. Conrad Schad."
It was held this paper was testamentary in character and that the wife as
administratrix was bound to account for and was properly surcharged with the
4
amount of the insurance. '
The aforegoing cases illustrate the general principle that the ascertainment of
testamentary intent is a judicial function in the matter of interpretation of language
and is therefore a question of law and primarily for the court. In the exercise
of this function the judge not only construes the meaning of the words as used per se
but also as light may be shed upon the language by all the circumstances surrounding what is called the res gesta.
Two

WITNESS RULE

The rule of Hock v. Hock" has already been discussed in connection with
the execution of wills. 45 It remains to ascertain its application to testamentary
character and intent. As determined in the cases heretofore discussed, testamentary
intent is a matter of law for the court in all instances but if the facts relied upon to
show testamentary intent are in dispute, on substantial points, the judge sitting as
a chancellor may ,determine to send the case to the jury and there have the issues
concluded. Several situations may be surveyed. A paper propounded as a will
may be quite clear as to the testamentary intent, viz, it is stated in the paper that
it is a will. Here the rule of res ipsa loquitur-the thing speaks for itself-is
applied and all that is necessary is to prove by two or more competent witnesses
that the paper propounded was signed by the alleged testator at the end thereof.
The paper is then properly admitted to probate. On the other hand the terms of
the paper may be equivocal. The signature is at the end thereof and is proved
by the requisite number of witnesses but here the rule of res ipsa loquitur does
not apply. The court may be in doubt as to whether the paper is testamentary in
intent. Extrinsic evidence is offered and by this process the doubt in the mind of
the court is dispelled. The writing becomes clear as to intent. Does the two witness rule have to be met? The answer is found in a review of the pertinent cases.
In Scott's Estate'" the decedent in his last illness had a paper prepared in the
form of a letter to his attorney giving him instructions relative to the preparation
of his will. The paper was signed by the decedent with his name and handed
to the scrivener who likewise signed it as a witness. After the paper was so signed
48Cf. Act June 28, 1923, P. L. 884 (no. 335) 40 PS 517, exempting proceeds life policies
from claims of creditors under certain conditions, also Bowers v. Bowers, 78 F. 2d. 776 (1935);
296 U. S. 640, 56 S. Ct. 173, 80 L. Ed. 455 (1935).
446
S. & R. 47 (1820).
45
An*e Chapter VII.
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and delivered to the scrivener, a son of decedent came into the room with whom
decedent had previously discussed the subject of his will. In the presence of the
scrivener decedent then told his son that he had just signed his will. Nothing else
was done and upon the death of the father the paper in question was offered for
probate and the signature was proved by three witnesses. But this did not prove
that a paper in the form of instructions for a will was itself actually a will. "Every
will shall be in writing ....

signed at the end thereof .

. .

. and proved by the

oaths or affirmations of two or more competent witnesses" is the requirement of
the law. It was held that parol evidence of the declarations of the decedent to
the scrivener and the son were admissible to prove the publication of the paper
though it was in the form of a letter of instruction, and further, that though the
son did not see the paper when the declarations as to its publication were made,
yet the circumstances, his connection and familiarity with the entire transaction,
pointing to the immediate act of disposition made his testimony admissible and
with that of the scrivener a sufficient compliance with the statute and the two witness rule.
Thus there was proved the testamentary character of the paper by two witnesses, one testifying to the fact directly, the other testifying to the fact indirectly
with the addition of circumstances, the total being held to comply with the rule.
In Carson's Appeal 47 there was an idential situation as to proofs but with the
difference that the proofs were concerning the execution and not as to the character
of the instrument.
In Willing's Estate 48 the facts were very similar to those of Scott's Estate,
supra, but the proofs were insufficient, there being but one witness and hence not a
compliance with the rule. It was held that the letter to the attorney with the endorsement on the envelope and the testimony in question were not sufficient taken
together to establish a valid codicil.
In Sunday's Estate 49 the facts were that testator thirteen years after ht made
his will executed seven judgment notes payable to his children and grandchildren.
The notes were drawn and witnessed by a justice of the peace. Decedent requested
the justice to keep the notes until he called for them and in case he should not call
for them after the death of the maker, the justice was to deliver them to the parties
named. The decedent never called and after his death the justice delivered the
notes as instructed. It was testified by one of the daughters of decedent that he
had said to her that "he had made out papers so that it would cover all his personal
property after his death to go to his children." The register refused to probate the
notes. In sustaining this action the Supreme Court held there was not sufficient
46147 Pa. 89 (1892), 23 A. 212.
4759 Pa. 493 (1868).
48212 Pa. 136 (1905), 61 A. 812.
49167 Pa. 30 (1895), 31 A. 353. Cf. Ryner's Est.,
347 Pa. 471 (1943), 32 A. 2d. 736.
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evidence to establish the testamentary character of these notes as codicils to the
will of testator and their probate was properly refused. Here it will be observed
that there was nothing equivocal about the character of these papers and they were
in no way connected with a testamentary disposition, except as such connection
might be established, if permissible, by parol evidence. In the opinion of the lower
court and approved by the Supreme Court appears the following:
"Where a decedent has done two acts, one of which is distinctively
testamentary in form, and the other and later act is as distinctly nontestamentary in form, and is couched with strict technical propreity, in the
aft language of contract, there is no reason for holding the latter testamentary, without clear proof of fraud, accident or mistake."
A reading of this case may justify the inference that if the two witness rule
had been met the notes would have been probative as codicils but there is no case
since that has carried out such a conclusion and on the other hand there are some
judicial expressions emphatically to the contrary. 50 It would appear contrary to
the very specification of the Wills Act that "every will shall be in writing" to permit
by parol evidence, however convincing, a paper" distinctly nontestamentary in form
"to be transmuted into a valid testamentary disposition. A few boider line cases
illustrate these sentiments. In Kisecker's Estate 6' the paper offered for probate,
signed by the decedent whose signature was proved in the usual way, was as follows:
"I this day, the 18th. of December, 1888, give all my property real
and personal to Ruthy D. Long and Vest A. Long, but I am to have
the use of all so long as I live, and I to pay all the taxes and keep up
repairs and after my death Ruthy D. Long and Vesta A. Long is to
have full and free use of all my property, for value received."
It was urged by the contestant that there was neither uncertainty nor ambiguity in the above.language and that it expressed a purpose to grant and convey
to the persons named a present right to the whole of the maker's estate, subject
to the subscriber's own life estate therein and that no case is presented for resort
to collateral or extrinsic evidence to discover the maker's intention. The trial court,
Stewart, P. J., considered:
"Judged by the language alone, that is, allowing the paper to
speak for itself, either a present conveyance or a posthumous disposition may have been intended. The paper is no more inconsistent with
the one than the other, while the terms used are such as are ordinarily
employed in conveyances of present interest, yet considered connectedly
andas a whole they seem to disclose a purpose that the instrument is
not to take effect until after the death of the maker. Were we shut
off from all considerations other than those to be found in the paper
itself, we would allow this latter view to prevail as the expressed inten60Fays Estate, 30 D. & C. 659 (1937), per Bolger, J.; Glass' Estate, 30 D. & C. 469 (1937),

per Stearne, J.

119o Pa. 476 (1899),

42 A. 886.
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tion of the maker. What little extrinsic evidence there is is only confirmatory of this conclusion, and there is *no reason whatever why it
may not be considered."
Continuing the learned court declared:
"Nothing short of a positive and unequivocal expression from the
maker herself could more strongly negative the idea of an intention
to convey presently than the facts andcircumstances disclosed in the
evidence. This paper was written and executed by the maker ten
years before her death. It was never delivered to any one, but remained to the end in her exclusive possession, not that it had been forgotten and was overlooked, for, until four or five days before her
death, she had kept it where she must frequently have seen it, and in
the very place of all others where one in her situation would be most
likely to keep a will, and least likely to keep a deed,-in her Bible.
A very few days before her death, she directed an attendant to read it
aloud in her hearing, and then to place it carefully away in some other
place. To no one did she speak of it as her will, yet her retaining it
in her possession in the manner she did, having it read over to her
within a few days of her death, and then directing that it be put away
in some saf eplace, such circumstances point unmistakably to the conclusion that she herself regarded it as a posthoumous disposition of her
property."
To the objection of contestant that the proof fell short of the statutory requirements the court further observed:
"It is true that there are cases which recognize the doctrine that
testamentary intent is an essential link in the chain of evidence necessary to establish a will, and like any other essential fact must be established by two witnesses. The cases of Scott's Est., supra, and Sunday's
Est., 167 Pa. 30, may be instanced. But an examination of these
cases and all others to like effect will show that this rule obtains only
where testamentary intent is derivable from the instrument itself, indeed, only in cases where the nature and form of the instrument are
inconsistent with such intent. Under such circumstances, where Lxtrinsic evidence is relied upon exclusively to show that the instrument
was intended to operate as a will, it is not difficult to understand why
the statutory requirements are held applicable. But where the form
and language used are entirely inconsistent with such intent, under
judicial construction, or the intent is fairly derivable from a consideration of the entire instrument, the necessity for two witnesses relates only
to the formal execution of the paper. Where an instrument is by its
terms a disposition of property to take effect after the maker's death, no
evidence of publication or acknowledgment on his part that it is a
last will is required. If legal proof be furnished of its execution, the
law will presume that the maker signed it understandingly, and that
he intended it to be his will."
The decree of the lower court sustaining the will was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, per curiam, as follows:

38
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"The paper in controversy was undoubtedly testamentary. It was
to take effect after the death of the testator. It was in writing and was
signed at the end thereof by the deceased. The opinion of the learned
court below covers every contention of the appellant so fully, and so
entirely to our satisfaction,, that we affirm the decree for the reasons
there stated."
It may be further noted that the procedure in the above case was an appeal
from the Register's refusal to admit the paper in question to probate and there was
no issue requested. Undoubtedly, however, the lower court would have refused
to grant an issue relying upon the evidence of testamentary intent as disclosed by
the paper itself specifying that the subscriber was to have the use of the property
so long as she lived and also the extrinsic facts of nondelivery by the subscriber and
the careful manner in which she preserved the paper up to the time of her death.
In Diehl's Estate 2 the following case came before the same trial court, wherein
a paper was offered for probate containing, inter alia, these words:
"I have given (not bequeathed) six hundred dollars or more, if
iron fence around the graveyard near the
necessary, to put a good place
.......
.I wish the fence to be put
Lutheran Church in this
up just as soon as the money can be collected for to have it put there.
This is my wishe."
This paper was duly signed and the learned court refused an issue d.v.n. On appeal,
Rice, P. J., said:
"This is not a case where no testamentary intent is apparent on
the face of the instrument, and where it must be proven exclusively by
extrinsic evidence. In such cases, the authorities seem to hold that two
witnesses are necessary, each of whom must separately depose to all
facts necessary, to complete the chain of evidence, so that if only one
witness were required the will would be fully proved by the testimony
of either. That rules does not apply, certainly not in all its strictness,
to a case where a testamentary intent is entirely consistent with the
language of the paper fairly construed in the light of the facts as to
its execution and preservation. This is well shown in the opinion of
Judge Stewart, approved by the Supreme Court in Kisecker's Estate."
In a dissenting opinion, Porter, J., observed:
"I can find nothing in the case, save the testimony of one or more
witnesses who say that the decedent referred to the paper as a will
and the fact that the paper was found in the decedent s possession, to
support the view that the document was in purpose testamentary."
About six years after the Kisecker Case,63 Judge Stewart was appointed to
the Supreme Bench and was later elected for the full term, serving until his death."4
5211 Pa. Super. Ct. 293 (1899).
68See note 51, supra.

5ADied November 25, 1920; 267 Pa. XXV.
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Both the Kisecker and the Diehl Cases, supra, along with Sunday's Estate, 5 have
been cited by annotators as establishing the rule in Pennsylvania, that if the writing
contains no evidence of an intention of the decedent that its operations shall be
dependent upon the event of his death, such testamentary intention must be proved
aliunde by the testimony of two witnesses.56 This is correct in one sense but is
but a half truth in another. If the extrinsic facts concerning a doubtful paper, contended to be testamentary, present a substantial dispute, the court should grant an
issue according to the rules established concerning the exercise of the judicial
function in such cases. 57 The two witness requirement is then applicable. However, the court may conclude on hearing the extrinsic evidence that any doubt
previously existin$ has been dispelled and the paper as a matter of law is determined
as either testamentary or not. In Sunday's Estate58 it is submitted the decision is
correct in that the notes were held non-testamentary, but the reasons assigned are
incorrect and misleading. The inference is that had there been sufficient extrinsic
proof the notes by parol testimony would be transmuted into codicils to the will of
the maker. There is some warrant for this inference in the interpretative remarks
of Judge Stewart in the Kisecker Case concerning Sunday's Estate, supra. But as
a Supreme Court Justice it appears that Stewart, J., set this matter aright in McCunis'
Estate59 where the register admitted to probate a paper signed by the decedent and
reading as follows:
"I want you, E. A. Kerr, to look after my property and if I don't
sell it, I will sign it over to you for taking care of me."
The lower court dismissed an appeal from the register's action in admitting to
probate this paper. In reversing the decree of the court below and setting aside the
probate, Stewart, J., declared:
"We are not insisting upon an inflexible adherence to the rule
that excludes parol evidence when offered to contradict, add to or
explain the contents of a will. We concede that the rule has been
sometimes relaxed in cases where the issue has been a question of the
execution of the instrument, or undue influence, or testamentary
capacity, but we know of no case where its admissibility has been
allowed when the issue was the testamentary character of an instrument absolutely free from ambiguity on its face such as this was."
There is no reference throughout the opinion to either the Kisecker or the
Diehi Cases. In both of these cases testamentary intent was found in the papers
and supported likewise by extrinsic evidence. The same observation applies to
Hengen's Estate.60 In Gibson's Estate6 l the two witness rule was declared in5SSee note 49 supra.
5612 Ann. Cas. 287.

57Ante Chapter.
6SSee note 49 supra,
59265 Pa. 523 (1920), 109 A. 156.
60337 Pa. 547 (1940), 12 A. 2d. 119.
61128 Pa. Super. Ct. 44 (1937), 193 A. 302.
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applicable for the same reason, the testamentary intent being found in the paper
itself.
The rule, therefore, deduced from the cases, concerning the two witness requirement, is that it only applies when issues are granted by the court to determine
questions of testamentary intent upon facts presented to the jury. If the writing
is doubtful and the extrinsic facts do not clear this doubt to the satisfaction of the
judge, the result may be either that the chancellor could not conscionably support
a verdict for the writing as showing testamentary intent and therefore holding
against probate, or that a substantial dispute having arisen, a verdict either way
could be supported, in which case the issue would be granted. However, if as
pointed out in Sunday's Estate, supra, the act is distinctly non testamentary and
couched with strict technical propriety in the words of contract, deed, note or other
non-testamentary form, there is no place for extrinsic evidence and to admit any is
to violate the terms of the Wills Act, specifying that "every will shall be in
writing."6 2 On the other hand if the doubt is dispelled by any extrinsic evidence to
the satisfaction of the court, the prayer for an issue will be denied and the paper
ordered admitted to probate.
INTENT LACKING

From the earliest times the reports have been replete with cases in which the
courts have declared testamentary intent to be manifestly lacking. In Stein v.
Noith 3 it was held that a letter written by an uncle to his nephew promising that
if the nephew would come to this country and prove obedient and follow his directions, that, he, the uncle, would make the nephew heir of his whole estate, was
64
not precise enough to operate as a will or as a contract. So in Shields v. Irwin
the facts were that Thomas Mifflin executed an instrument under seal declaring that
he was justly indebted to a certain person for personal services and that his executors
should pay to this person the sum of $1,000.00. This instrument was held to be
an obligation and not a testamentary disposition. Likewise in Rhoads v. Rhoads 66
the instrument in question was held to be a contract rather than testamentary and
the principle of estoppel was applied where the parties had so treated the instrument as a contract.
In Patterson v. English66 the paper consisted of six different items written
with a lead pencil on the last four pages of decedent's memorandum book, entitled
"Merchants Account Book and Buyer's Guide," which was found in a drawer in
the desk of the decedent. The items were wholly disconnected and separated from
each other by spaces of greater or less width and a line drawn between them with
the name C. E. Patterson written with a lead pencil immediately below the last
62

Sec. 2, Act June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, 20 PS 191.

683 Yeates 324 (1802).
643 Yeates 389 (1802).
65126 Pa. Super. Ct. 141 (1937), 190 A. 533.
6671 Pa. 454 (1872).
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item. It was held that the paper did not disclose any evidence of a testamentary
disposition and should be rejected as a will.61
In Kauffman's EstatL58 a man, in military service, wrote a long social letter

to his brother, incidentally saying therein: "I am going to take out $10,000 insurance and make it payable to you and you can give some to the rest of them,
after E.A. gets half of it and you get one-fourth of it, if anything happens to me."
The insurance was taken out and the insured died but there was no beneficiary
named in the policy. The above letter was admitted to probate and on appeal to
the orphans' court the decision of the register was reversed. On appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the lower court saying, inter alia, per curiam:
"This letter was not in any sense a testamentary writing but only
a direction as to the disposition of an intended gift, inter vivos, which
deeedent never completed."
So, in Tyson's Estate 69 decedent wrote a letter saying:
"I am making out my will leaving my securities to you." No will was found
and it was held that the above writing was not a will but only an expression indi70
cating a purpose.to make one, which was never carried out. In Lewis' Estate
the writer addressed a letter to a bank directing that an account of the subscriber
be made a joint one, "the money to be drawn only in case of my death." The letter
was held not to be testamentary.
In Bowlby v. Thunder, 71 the testator left a will properly signed and in usual
legal form giving his entire estate to his wife. Certain memoranda containing
admonitions from the testator as to what the beneficiary under his will should do
were offered in probate along with the will proper. It was held that these two
papers although admitted to probate form no part of the testator's will and did
not create a trust or in any way qualify the estate given to the wife. A series of
interesting cases involving trusts has at various times been urged as being testamentary in nature. In Lines v. Lines 72 it was held that a voluntary deed transferring property to a trustee to be distributed by him among specified beneficiaries
at such time as in his discretion he should see proper, the income to be paid to the
donor during life till the distribution, but not made before his death, with a power
of revocation reserved to the donor, is not a testamentary instrument. Furthermore, such a deed involving personal property cannot be impeached by the wife
as in fraud of her rights, nor can it be said that a reserved right of revocation is
7
inconsistent with the creation of a valid trust. In Windolph v. Girard Trust Co. 3
the same doctrine was laid down on similar facts with this difference that the wife
67Williams, J., questioned whether a will written in lead pencil was valid;
68283 Pa. 375 (1925), 129 A. 98.
69336 Pa. 497 (1939), 9 A. 2d. 733.
70139 Pa. Super. Ct. 83 (1940), 11 A. 2d. 667.
71 105 Pa. 173 (1884).
72142 Pa. 149 (1891), 21 A. 809.
73245 Pa. 549 (1914), 91 A. 634.

f. note 5 supra.
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was the settlor of the trust, involving, as in Lines v. Lines, supra, personal prop74
perty.
The doctrine of Lines v. Lines and the Windolph Case, supra, was again
75
applied in Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title & Trust Co. and it was emphasized by Simpson, J., that the trusts created thereby are active. It was further explained that so far as concerns his personal estate, a husband may do what he
pleases with it and the wife cannot be heard to complain, and citing Potter Title
and Trust Co. v. Braunn 76 it was stated that actual fraud upon the part of the husband would have to be shown by the wife to set aside such a trust and this is not
intent was to deprive the wife of her
shown merely by proving that the husband's
77
distributive share in his estate as widow.
DiscuSSION
From the aforegoing cases in this chapter the following propositions are drawn:
1. A will may be written with any material and upon any material but the
nature of the materials and the position of the testator at the time of execution will
throw considerable light on the testamentary intent.
2. A will may be in any form of language provided testamentary intent can
be construed therefrom.
3. The ascertainment of testamentary intent is a matter of interpretation of
language and a question of law for the Court.
6. If the Court determines that an issue should be granted or that the facts
presented to the Court as the trier of the same raise a doubt, this doubt must be
dispelled by the two witness requirement.
7. If the language of the paper propounded is susceptible of but one meaning,
there is no question of interpretation and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible.
4
7 Some early cases involving trusts, Frederick's Appeal, 52 Pa. 338 (1866); Brown v. Mattocks, 103 Pa. 16 (1883); Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. 531 (1898), 40 A. 1096; Eisenlohr's
Estate (no. 2) 258 Pa. 438 (1917), 102 A. 117, as to effect of paper given by partner to become
effective at his death, held not testamentary; Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582 (1924), 124 A. 176;
Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Klemr, 12 D. & C. 44 (1928), that a trust in personal property may be
created by parol and distinguishing from testamentary disposition.

76307 Pa. 570 (1932), 161 A. 721, Kephart, J., dissents; see 8 T. L. R. 531 (1934).
76294 Pa. 482 (1928), 144 A. 401.
7The following may be consulted. DeNoble v. DeNoble, 331 Pa. 273 (1938), 200 A. 77,
when husband satisfied two judgments against his son with intent to prevent his wife from sharing
in the same in case of his death, held not fraudulent. Fritz's Estate, 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 463 (1939),
5 A. 2d. 601, a gift of judgment note held good and not in fraud of wife. Kirk v. Kirk, 340 Pa.
203 (1940), 16 A. 2d. 47. Mere proof of conveyance of realty or gift of personalty by either
spouse without knowledge of the other does not constitute a prima facie case of fraud but actual
fraud must be proved in addition. For a case where transfer was held fraudulent, see Stewart's
Estate, 334 Pa. 356 (1939), 5 A. 2d. 910.
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8. Whee the language of the paper is clear, the subscriber is bound by the
8
legal intent deduced therefrom except in cases of fraud, accident or mistake.1
4. Where the language is not clear the Court may be aided in the interpretation by extrinsic evidence, in which case the two witnesses requirement is not
applicable and circumstances disclosed may resolve any doubt existing as to the
nature of the instrument.
5. If the Court determines as a matter of law that the evidence for the contestant or proponent would not support a verdict for either as the case might be,
there are no grounds for the granting of an issue d.v.n,

78A will containing no intelligent bequest or devise is void for uncertainty and parol evidence
is not admissible to explain what the testator meant by such an instrument, Kelley v. Kelley, 25 Pa.
460 (1854); Carlin's Estate, 36 D. & C. 704 (1939); Douglas' Estate, 303 Pa. 227 (1931), 154
A. 376; Brennan's Estate, 324 Pa. 410 (1936), 188 A. 160.
See generally 94 A. L. R. 26 for comprehensive note on topic: Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Aid Interpretation of Will.

